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ON ACADEMIC FADS  AND FASHIONS
Cass R. Sunstein*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Why  did  critical  legal  studies  disappear?  Will  it  reappear?  Why
does the Federalist Society prosper?  Why,  and when, do people  write
books on constitutional law, rather than tort law or antitrust?  Why did
people  laugh  at  the notion  of "animal  rights,"  and why  do  they  now
laugh  less?  Why  do  law  professors  seem  increasingly  respectful  of
"textualism"  and  "originalism,"  ideas that produced  ridicule  and con-
tempt  just  two  decades  ago?  How  do  book  reviewers  choose  what
books to review? Why has law and economics had such staying power?
Academics  are  generally committed  to truth, and  they  are drawn
to ideas that can be shown  to be  good ones. The  most optimistic an-
swer to these questions is that ideas survive because and to the extent
that they are  true or good. On this view, law  and economics  has out-
lasted critical  legal studies because  it has much more  to offer. Textu-
alism and originalism have had a resurgence because much can be said
on  their  behalf.  Book  reviewers,  in  the  academic  domain,  tend  to
choose to review the best books.
In my view,  these claims  contain some  truth, but they  are far  too
optimistic.  Academics,  like  everyone  else,  are  subject  to cascade ef-
fects. They start, join, and  accelerate  bandwagons.  More  particularly,
they  are  subject  to  the  informational signals sent  by  the  acts  and
statements  of others. They  participate  in  creating  the very  signals  to
which they  respond. Academics,  like everyone  else,  are also suscepti-
ble to the reputational  pressures imposed by the (perceived)  beliefs of
others. They respond to these pressures, and by so doing, they help to
amplify  them.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  fads,  fashions,  and  band-
wagon effects can be found in academia, including the academic study
of law. Fortunately, the underlying forces  can spark creativity and give
new  ideas  a chance  to prosper. Unfortunately,  these  same  forces  can
also produce error and confusion.
*  Karl  N.  Llewellyn  Distinguished  Service  Professor  of Jurisprudence,  University  of
Chicago,  Law  School and  Department  of  Political  Science.  - Ed.  I  am  grateful  to Jack
Goldsmith,  Tracey  Meares,  Eric Posner, and  Richard  Posner  for helpful  comments  on  an
earlier draft.
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Sometimes cascades have enduring effects. But in many fields aca-
demic cascades  are fragile,  with  numerous people  focusing  on issues
and  adopting  methods  that disappear  in  short  order.  Some  cascades
produce unpredictable  and seemingly  random movements,  as external
shocks  lead  in  dramatic  directions.  In social  life,  small  sparks  cause
wildfires; it is for this reason, among others, that we  cannot easily pre-
dict  future  academic  trends, or  foresee  new  movements  in  the  aca-
demic study  of law.  (In  1985,  would  it have  been  possible  to predict
the resurgence, in the  1990s, of interest in the study of social norms?1
Or  the  rise  of  interest  in  cyberspace?  In  the  Second  Amendment?)
There  is  even  a  tipping point  phenomenon  here,  in  which  a  certain
pressure,  from  the  perceived  views  of others,  can  produce  a sudden
"rush"  toward a particular methodology or point of view.2
In  this Essay,  I  attempt  to cast  light on  the  general  topic of aca-
demic  bandwagons  and  cascades,  with  particular  reference  to  law.
Several caveats  are in  order. First, my  focus here  is  on trends  in aca-
demic law, but informational  and  reputational  signals are  ubiquitous.
The same forces  discussed  here  help explain  many social movements,
including reactions  to environmental risks, the rise and fall of commu-
nism, the success or failure of students and job candidates, the creation
of ethnic identifications,  and the rise and partial fall of affirmative ac-
tion.3 Second, I  do not mean  to present any criticism  of legal  scholar-
ship in general, or to depict those who  produce  it as especially  prone
to informational  and reputational  influences. A general attack on legal
scholarship  would  be senseless, if only because  so  much of it is  obvi-
ously excellent. Third, I  aim only to establish the existence of cascade
effects, not to give a clear test for distinguishing cascades from cases in
which approaches  and  arguments have spread  because of their merits
(though  some  of  my  remarks  will  bear  on  that  issue).  Fourth,  my
treatment  will be informal and anecdotal, offering examples that will, I
hope,  be  intuitive  and  familiar.  With  respect  to  the  underlying  phe-
nomena,  I  draw  on  some  more  systematic  and  formal  treatments,4
1. Fueled by ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
2.  For a popular treatment, see MALCOLM GLADWELL,  THE TIPPING POINT (2000).
3.  See, e.g., David Hirschleifer,  The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and
Informational Cascades,  in THE NEW  ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR  188, 189 (Mariano
Tommasi  &  Kathryn  Ierulli  eds.,  1995);  TIMUR  KURAN,  PUBLIC  LIES,  PRIVATE TRUTHS
(1997).
4.  See supra note 3. A  helpful overview  is Sushil Bikchandani  et al., Learning From the
Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J.  ECON. PERSP.  151
(1998).  In  the  social  sciences,  the  analytical  literature  on  cascades  begins  with  Magoroh
Maruyama,  The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal  Processes, 51  AM.
SCIENTIST  164  (1963);  THOMAS  C.  SCHELLING,  MICROMOTIVES  AND  MACROBEHAVIOR
(1978);  and  Mark  Granovetter,  Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83  AMER.  J.  OF
SOC.  1420  (1978).  For  analysis  of  purely  informational  cascades,  see  Sushil  Bikchandani,
David Hirshleifer, & Ivo Welch, A  Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as
Informational Cascades, 100 J. OF POL.  ECON. 992  (1992);  David Hirschleifer, supra note 3;
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both general  and  particular, and try to apply  the  central ideas to the
academic  context.  Obviously  a  great  deal  might  be  said  about  this
topic; my brief treatment here is intended only to be a start.
II.  A NOTE ON ACADEMIC UTILITY FUNCTIONS AND THE MARKET
FOR IDEAS
To make progress on this topic, it is necessary  to have some sense
of what academics  care about,  and also to know  something about the
nature of the market for academic  ideas. On these subjects, I hope not
to say  anything controversial. But because  some account  is  implicit in
any description of cascades,  I offer some brief notations.'
Most  academics  care  about  what  most  people  care  about.  They
seek to  retain  their jobs  and  to have  the  good  opinion  of  (relevant)
others. Few of them are indifferent  to status. But they also care, more
than most, about ideas, and they are willing to forego various benefits
in order to be able to think and talk about issues suitable for teaching
and  academic  research.  Many  academics  are  interested  in pursuing
truth  as such.  Those  who do or use empirical work  often  fall  in  this
category,  and  the  same  is true  for those  whose  basic  goal  is  to help
produce clarity and coherence  in the law. In the context  of law, there
is an additional point: Many academics would like to contribute to im-
provements  in  law  and  society by helping  to  make  law  better  in the
domains of, for  example, antitrust law, race or sex equality, and  free-
dom of speech. Of course academics  are a diverse lot on these counts.
For some, reputation  matters  a great  deal;  for others,  the pursuit  of
truth or justice is especially important.
There  is  also  a  market  for  academic  ideas,  and  this  market  will
have  significant  effects  on what  academics  do.  In  this  market,  aca-
demics  are  the producers,  while  consumers  include  other  academics,
students,  government  officials,  judges,  and  law  clerks. The  extent  of
interest from these groups  will of course vary with  the material; some
academic  work,  for  instance,  is of direct  interest  only  to  other  aca-
demics.  The market here  is unusual  in many  ways, above all because
no one pays directly for what academics produce. Law reviews usually
do not compensate contributors for articles and essays, and the same is
true for other journals  (in economics  and philosophy, for example)  in
Lisa  Anderrson  &  Charles  Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87  AM.  ECON.
REV.  847 (1997);  Abhiijit Banerjee, A  Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797
(1992).  See  also B.  Douglas  Bernheim,  A  Theory of Conformity, 102  J.  POL.  ECON.  841
(1994)  (discussing similar mechanisms).
5. This  section was  not  included in  the  initial drafts of the paper. It  was suggested  by
several commentators on an earlier draft, who urged  an elaboration  of the utility function of
law professors and of the  market for academic ideas. Obviously I think that the commenta-
tors are right, but  the fact  that these topics are  discussed here is itself an illustration  of the
forces  I discuss in this Essay.
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which law professors might publish. Publishers will pay for the right to
publish  books,  and  professors  receive  royalties,  but  little  money  is
usually involved, and hence the motivation for writing books is rarely
material  for academics.  On the  other hand, indirect compensation  -
monetary and nonmonetary - is omnipresent. Job opportunities  are a
direct  function  of what academics  produce,  and  at many schools,  sal-
ary is partly a reflection of quality and quantity of publications. Invita-
tions  to conferences  and  the  like - dreaded  by some,  welcomed  by
many - are also affected  by the perceived quality of academic work.
It is here, above all, that the market disciplines  academic activity.
In a well-functioning  market, only or mostly valuable  ideas will be
produced  - although  of course  some  ideas will  be valuable  even  if
they  are misleading or incorrect. But  it is not at all  clear that an ordi-
nary economic  market, based  on the willingness-to-pay  criterion,  is a
good way to produce  valuable  ideas in law or elsewhere. Such  a mar-
ket  might  well  cater  unduly  to  existing  tastes  or  to  the  interests  of
those with  a great deal  of money  to pay; research  funding  by groups
with  a large  financial  stake  in  outcomes  is therefore  a problem.  The
complex  system  of indirect  compensation,  alongside  the  tenure  sys-
tem,  is  commonly  defended  as  a  way of insulating  the production  of
ideas  from ordinary markets.  If this complex system works extremely
well (by the appropriate  criteria), it will lack "bad cascades" - that is,
cascades in which valueless ideas travel not because they are valuable,
but because of the mechanisms that I will be discussing here. But I will
suggest that in many contexts,  an  absence  of private  information,  to-
gether with  a concern  for  reputation  and  various features  of human
cognition, can produce academic cascades that are bad as well as good.
III.  INFORMATION-INDUCED  ACADEMIC CASCADES
Academic  cascades  take  two  forms:  informational  and  reputa-
tional. Let us begin with the role of information.
Most  people,  in  most  domains,  lack  reliable  information  about
what  is  true and what  is right. For this reason, they are  interested  in
the signals  of others. The point holds for the selection of movies and
restaurants  and  carpets;  it  holds  for ideas  as well.  If you  are  unsure
whether  textualism  is  a sensible  or pernicious  approach  to  constitu-
tional interpretation, you might care  a great deal  about other people's
views. Of course academics, especially  older  ones, are sometimes  set-
tled in  their  views. Often  they  are  confident  that they  know what to
think, and to that extent, they are not terribly susceptible to the views
of others. (Notice here that the precondition for immunity to informa-
tional influences  is confidence  about one's preexisting  views, not ade-
quate or accurate information.)  But among some groups,  and in some
fields,  any  settlement  is  provisional  and  somewhat  fragile.  In  many
fields, including law, young people in particular can both influence and
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be influenced by informational  signals. If many people are susceptible
to influence,  cascades  can  readily  develop.  The  significant  swings  in
legal scholarship over  the last decades  suggest that  academic  lawyers
are indeed susceptible.
Suppose, for example, that John, a young academic, does not know
whether textualism is a sensible approach  to constitutional interpreta-
tion, but that Mary, a slightly older academic,  is in favor of it.6 If John
is otherwise in equipoise,  but attaches  value to what Mary thinks  be-
cause  she  seems wise or has often been  right in the past,  it is easy  to
see  how John might come to Mary's  view.  If John and  Mary believe
that textualism makes sense,  Sally, a contemporary of John, might  be
moved to  agree,  at least  if she lacks  any reason  to be confident  that
they  are wrong.  And  once  John, Mary,  and  Sally  come  to a  certain
view,  David,  a recently  hired  faculty  member,  will  likely  agree  with
them  unless  he has enough private knowledge  - or,  more  precisely,
confidence  - about  his  antecedent  view  to  stand  in  their  way.  At
some point one or more of these people might even produce an article
or book in defense of textualism.
As stylized as this example seems, I believe that it captures a great
deal about academic movements,  in law  and elsewhere.  Consider, for
example,  the rise of feminism within the law  schools, starting roughly
in the mid-1980s. In many places, feminism appears to have succeeded
through  a kind of informational  cascade,  as people who would  other-
wise be skeptical or unsure came to think that feminist approaches  had
something to offer - not (in many cases) because they carefully inves-
tigated the underlying  claims and believed  that they were illuminating
or right,  but because  the  beliefs  of others seemed  hard  to resist  for
those lacking a great deal of confidence in their own (skeptical) judg-
ments. If so many people  seemed  to think feminist  approaches  to law
were valuable, mustn't they be right?7
Or consider the life and  apparent death of the critical legal studies
movement,  which  flourished  (again  speaking  roughly)  from  1977  to
1989. When I was  a visiting professor at Harvard Law  School in 1987,
critical  legal studies powerfully  influenced both students  and younger
faculty. A significant number of students appeared to sense what criti-
cal legal studies was about, and they seemed to agree with it. A signifi-
cant  number  of  assistant  professors  (some  of  them  now  professors,
with apparently little  continuing interest in critical  legal studies) were
in the  same  category.  Within  both groups,  the  informational  signals
sent  by the  large  number  of critical  legal  studies  members  were  ex-
tremely important.
6.  The example adapts from the treatment in Bikchandani, supra note 4.
7.  In some contexts, a  possible answer is that they might be wrong, especially if they are
participating in a cascade, rather than acting independently.
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At the University  of Chicago  Law School, much the  same  can be
said, then and now, about the economic analysis of law. Many faculty
members  engage  in  economic  analysis of  law,  and  a majority  of the
faculty shows considerable interest in the basic approach. As a general
rule,  younger faculty  members  are  especially  interested  in  the  infor-
mational  signals  sent  by  their  colleagues,  and  at  Chicago,  many  of
them end up doing work that is  influenced  by economics.  Cascade  ef-
fects  are  even  easier  to  observe  within  the  student  body,  as  certain
concepts  (involving, for example,  the value  of efficiency,  the implica-
tions  of the  Coase  theorem,  and  the  futility  of redistributive  regula-
tion) spread as if by contagion. Of course it is true that many students,
and some faculty members, show no interest in the economic analysis
of law. But mere exposure  to economic thinking, voiced in many set-
tings  (including workshops, lunch discussions,  and  comments on  arti-
cles), leads in the expected directions.
As informational  cascades  develop, people  end  up amplifying  the
very informational  signals to which  they have responded. Scholarship,
including  the  production  of articles  and  books,  is  much  affected  by
processes  of this kind. If this is  so, it is possible  to predict, with  some
confidence,  that  the  publication  of books  on  various  topics or  with
various  methodologies  often  will  be  highly  concentrated  over  time,
showing  that fads  and fashions  play a role  in  the  academic  world  as
elsewhere.
In  making  these  claims,  I  do  not  mean  to  make  any  normative
claims  about feminism,  critical  legal studies,  or economic  analysis  of
law. Nor do I mean  to suggest that those who are vulnerable  to infor-
mational pressures are weak or irrational. People who know  that they
have limited  information certainly  should pay  attention  to the  signals
given by others. And whether pressures of this kind will lead in desir-
able  directions cannot be decided in the abstract. All that can be  said
is that the underlying mechanisms give little reason for confidence that
academic  "movements"  will  be  good  ones.  Ideas  can  spread,  even
among people  with some expertise,  despite the fact that little is to be
said on their behalf.
From these  examples, we  can  also see  the possibility  of purely  or
mostly  local  informational  cascades.  Outside  the  academic  world,
some  communities  come to believe  that abandoned  hazardous  waste
dumps are  extremely  dangerous,  whereas others think that they pose
no hazard at all. So, too, some law schools might come to embrace the
economic  analysis  of  law,  whereas  others  might  see  enthusiasm  for
traditional  doctrinal  analysis - not because  of a large number  of in-
dependent  judgments, but  because  of mutual  interactions  and  influ-
ences.
1256 [Vol.99:1251Foreword
IV.  REPUTATION AND REPUTATIONAL CASCADES
It should be clear that something important is missing from the pic-
ture: people's concerns about their reputations.'  Generally people care
about  what  others  think  of them,  and  most  academics  are,  on this
count, like most other people.
In many law schools and economics departments, an effort to show
that centralized  planning  really  can work well, or to vindicate  social-
ism, or to show that people are irrational, would be very risky, no mat-
ter the quality  of the relevant work. People might be ridiculed. They
might  well  jeopardize  their  careers.  At  many  law  schools,  the  same
would  be true for people  who attempted  to show that current differ-
ences between  men  and women  are biological rather  than social, and
to bring evidence to that effect to bear on legal issues.
Reputational  considerations influence  the public behavior  of most
people,  not excluding  academics.  This is not because  people  lack in-
tegrity, or are sycophantic, or are unwilling to follow their own paths.
It  is  simply  because  most  people,  most  of  the  time,  want  others  to
think  well  - or  at  least  not  ill  - of them. Of  course,  people  have
varying susceptibility to reputational pressures.  Some people can with-
stand  a  great  deal;  others  will  be  inclined  to  take  the  safe  course,
showing reluctance to say, or especially to publish, anything that could
create trouble for them in the future. And of course  sometimes  those
who incur reputational sanctions in one place (the nonacademic world,
for  example)  will reap reputational  benefits elsewhere  (perhaps their
local academic community).  Those who seem to be venturing  out on
their own, and to be "brave,"  might in fact be motivated by the goal  of
gaining status within a particular group.
Because most people  care about the  views of others, and  because
people  have  varying,  rather  than  uniform,  susceptibility  to  reputa-
tional pressures,  it  is  easy  to  imagine  reputational  cascades  with  re-
spect to actions or stated beliefs.9 Suppose, for example, that A  and B
would think  ill of anyone who argues that the minimum  wage  should
be significantly  increased.  C, who  is not sure  what  to  think  about  a
higher minimum wage, might be unmoved privately  by the views of A
and B, but nonetheless might not want to incur the wrath of A  and B,
or to  seem ignorant  of basic economic  principles,  or to appear  indif-
ferent to economic  efficiency.  If so,  C might show no enthusiasm  for
an increase  in the minimum wage,  or might even agree  with A  and B
that an increase  would  be  a bad  idea. If D is otherwise  in  equipoise,
she might be most reluctant to oppose A, B, and C publicly. Mounting
reputational pressures might well lead E, F, G, and H, and many more,
8.  On reputation and signaling in general, see ERIC POSNER,  LAW  AND  SOCIAL NORMS
(2000).
9.  See KURAN, supra note 3.
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to join  the  bandwagon.  Eventually  a  large  number  of people  might
speak  as  if  the  minimum  wage  should  not  be  increased.  The  result
would be to affect academic discussion  of government's role  in the la-
bor market, including the treatment of this topic in articles and books.
Here,  too,  a  highly  stylized  example  seems  to  help  account  for
many shifts  in  the academic  world. The rise of feminism within  legal
academia undoubtedly  has a great deal to do with reputational and in-
formational  incentives.  In the  early  1980s, those  who expressed  con-
tempt for feminist  scholarship were rarely punished for doing so, and
were sometimes rewarded. Currently those who express contempt  for
feminist scholarship generally  (of course not always)  put their reputa-
tion in considerable  danger: If a young  academic  chooses to write on
certain  topics,  or from certain  points of  view,  the  reputational  sanc-
tions might be quite severe. At the University of Chicago Law School,
I cannot recall many faculty members  expressing public support  for a
substantial  increase in the minimum wage, though I would not be sur-
prised  if more than one faculty member actually believes that such an
increase  would  be  a good  idea.  Five  years ago, those  who borrowed
from  behavioral  economics were  viewed  with  considerable  suspicion
inside the world of law and economics;  through a cascade effect, this is
decreasingly true.
It follows that "political correctness"  is hardly  a narrow phenome-
non involving  the practices of left-leaning academics.  Wherever  repu-
tational  pressures  are in  place,  a  form of "political  correctness"  will
discipline  action  and public  statements.  Reputational  cascades  are  a
possible consequence.
V.  GROUP POLARIZATION  AND ACADEMIC "SCHOOLS"
A closely  related  phenomenon  helps explain  the initial growth  of
academic fashions and gives some guidance on how to create, and how
not to create, an academic  "school."  The phenomenon  is that of group
polarization." In brief, the idea behind group polarization is that when
a group  of people engages  in  deliberation, group  members will move
toward a more extreme position in line with their predeliberation  incli-
nations. This  is  the  typical  pattern among  deliberating  bodies.  Thus,
for example,  a group of Federalist  Society members,  inclined to sup-
port  originalism,  is  likely  to  be  extremely  enthusiastic  about  origi-
nalism after  discussing  it with one  another. So, too,  a semiformal or-
ganization of law professors, meeting once a month, is likely to emerge
with a stronger commitment to critical race theory if its members  are
inclined,  before  discussion,  to  be  favorably  disposed  toward critical
race theory. It would be easy to multiply examples.
10.  See ROGER BROWN,  SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY  (2d ed. 1986);  Cass R.  Sunstein, Delib-
erative Trouble: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000).
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Massive evidence, from many different countries, supports  the ba-
sic prediction. Why does group polarization occur? Though no cascade
need be involved,1  the two principal explanations are close  to the ex-
planations  for  informational  and  reputational  cascades.  The  first  in-
volves informational influences. In a deliberating group with an  initial
tendency in favor of X  and against  Y, there will be  a disproportionate
number of arguments  in favor  of X, simply because  most people will
speak out on behalf of X.  Group members will have thought of some,
but not all, of the arguments in  that direction. After deliberating,  the
arguments for X will seem stronger to individual members, and the ar-
guments for Y  will seem even weaker. It is to be expected that discus-
sion will move people to a more extreme form of their original enthu-
siasm for X.
The second  explanation for group polarization  points to social  in-
fluences.  Most people, emphatically  including  professors  of law, care
about their reputations  and their self-conception.  Suppose,  for exam-
ple,  that you are inclined to think that affirmative  action does not of-
fend  the Constitution, but you are not entirely sure;  suppose too that
you find yourself  in a group  that also  rejects the idea that  affirmative
action offends  the Constitution. If you think of yourself  as the sort of
person who is, more than most, inclined to support the constitutional-
ity  of affirmative  action  programs,  you  might  move  a  bit, if only  to
maintain your reputation within the group and your self-conception on
the issue at hand. The evidence  strongly supports the proposition that
this happens. 2
In the  academic  context,  the  lesson  is  simple.  A  group  of like-
minded people,  thinking about some issue or topic, is  highly  likely to
move  toward  a more  extreme  position, not merely fortifying but am-
plifying their predeliberation inclinations. Through this route, it is pos-
sible  to make some progress in understanding  the creation  and effects
of academic  "schools."  In the early  1980s, for example,  the critical  le-
gal studies movement flourished  at Harvard Law School in particular,
no  doubt  in  part because  of the  presence  of members  who talked  a
great  deal with  one  another  and  fueled  their predeliberation  inclina-
tions.  Several  influential  books  emerged  from  these  discussions." 3  In
roughly the same period, the Federalist Society was created at Chicago
and  Yale,  and  the  existence  of  a  group  of like-minded  people  un-
doubtedly helped to fuel certain commitments. In fact, it is reasonable
to speculate that the growth of conservative legal thought, within both
faculties  and student groups, has had a great deal to do with the exis-
11.  This is because  group polarization can  result from  simultaneous independent  influ-
ences on group members.
12.  See BROWN, supra note 10.
13.  See, e.g., ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT  (1985).
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tence of a collection  of people  who are relatively  well-organized  and
who are able  to ensure that like-minded people can find some kind of
home.
VI.  QUALIFICATIONS,  EXTENSIONS,  IMPLICATIONS
Informational  and reputational  influences, as well  as group  polari-
zation, play a significant role  in academic  life. Cascade effects are pre-
sent here as elsewhere. For this reason, we should expect a large num-
ber of fads and fashions in the academic study of law. I would predict,
for example, that a citation analysis would show many academic "bub-
bles"  - rapid  rises  and  declines  in  references  to  certain  ideas  and
people.14 But this basic sketch omits important parts of the overall pic-
ture.
A.  Leaders, Followers, Polarizers
With  respect  to both  informational  signals  and  reputational  pres-
sures,  all people  are not created  equal. Some carry more  weight than
others.  For  example,  the  signals sent  by  well-known  academics,  and
academics  at  well-known  schools,  are  likely to  be  especially  loud.  If
faculty  members  at Yale  end  up endorsing  a new method  for  under-
standing law, there might seem to be particularly good reason  to take
that method  seriously.  And it is  less  likely that people  who embrace
the  method  will face  the  kind of reputational  sanction  that could  be
imposed if the method were being used at a little-known school. Those
who are in a position to start cascades operate as leaders, above all be-
cause of the social amplification of their voices. 15 Note that this ampli-
fication can  occur independently  of the merits of the  argument  being
made. In listening carefully  to well-known people, or to people at well-
known  schools,  followers  are  probably  behaving  rationally,  because
such people are unusually likely to be interesting or correct, simply as
a statistical matter.  But there  are no guarantees  here,  and  hence  ar-
guments can  be amplified  even if they  are meritless. (Perhaps the  re-
sulting bubble will eventually pop, as discussed below.)
Some  of the relevant  leaders are simply saying what they  think to
be  true;  others  affirmatively  want  followers,  perhaps  because  they
seek  status, or perhaps  because  they  want  to ensure  that their  ideas
are disseminated.  Such people  take steps  self-consciously  to promote
cascade effects, perhaps by organizing conferences, reading groups, or
even journals. More specifically,  we can describe  as "polarization  en-
trepreneurs"  those  people  who  foster  deliberative  groups  of  like-
14.  Some support can be found in Robert Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship:  A  Sta-
tistical  Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.  517, 527 (2000).
15.  Cf.  GARY BECKER & KEVIN MURPHY,  SOCIAL ECONOMICS  140-43 (2001).
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minded people  and ensure that participants share a common method-
ology or point of view. Exclusion of outsiders, and inclusion of a large
number of insiders, is an important component of this strategy.
An obvious  implication  is  that if the  goal is to  spread  ideas,  it  is
probably  best to begin by promoting discussion  among groups of like-
minded  people.  If members  of such  groups  speak  mostly  or only  to
one  another, views might  become  entrenched,  and the  entrenchment
among the views  of increasingly  large groups might initiate  a cascade
effect. A much worse  strategy - often a doomed strategy - is  to en-
sure that people with  new ideas  are placed  in heterogeneous  groups,
where  their  ideas  are  unlikely  to  travel,  or  might  be  squelched,  or
might even be subject to self-silencing.
In fact, the forces here are compounded  by another:  the availabil-
ity  heuristic.  It is  well  known  that certain  facts and  ideas  are  cogni-
tively "available,"  or highly salient, and  that this cognitive  availability
can exert a large influence on beliefs and decisions.16 If a leader, or an
idea,  ends  up  widely  known,  through  independent  decisions  or
through cascade  effects,  dramatic  changes  in  scholarly  paths  can  be
expected.
B.  Starting and Stopping Cascades
Some  people  are  relatively  immune  to  the  influences  discussed
here. As I have suggested, people who are confident  about their views
are especially likely to resist informational and reputational incentives.
The  point  suggests  that in  some  arenas,  cascades  are  likely  to  arise
quite infrequently. Academic  areas  are highly  variable  on this count,
and academics in some domains have a great deal of confidence, which
immunizes  themselves  from  cascade  effects.  In  fields  with  well-
established  methods and  goals,  we  should  expect cascades  to be  un-
common. In the sciences,  for example,  large-scale  shifts  certainly  oc-
cur, but  the  existence  of settled methods  makes  cascade  effects  un-
likely 7  - far  less  probable  than  in,  for  example,  comparative
literature.  Law, economics,  and  psychology  are perhaps  intermediate
cases.
This  point  raises  an important  question:  When  and why  do  aca-
demic cascades start and stop? A crucial reason has to do with external
shocks. Suppose,  for  example,  that  a group  of people  believes  some
fact.  Suppose  that evidence  shows that the  belief  is  false. The  belief
will fade because it has been demonstrated to be wrong.
But  external  shocks  can  take  many  different  forms.  Sometimes
academic  trends, especially  in  law,  have  nothing  to do  with  demon-
16.  See JONATHAN  BARON, THINKING AND  DECIDING  (3d ed. 2000).
17.  This  is  a  possible  reading  of  THOMAS  KUHN,  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION  (1970).
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strated fact,  but are  greatly  affected  by what happens  outside  of the
academic domain. For example, the selection of Antonin Scalia to be a
member  of the  Supreme  Court  undoubtedly  had  a great  deal  to  do
with the  legitimation  of originalism  and textualism, methods  favored
by Justice  Scalia.  This  is partly  because Justice  Scalia's opinions  pro-
vided a kind of focal point for  academic  debate; it  is also because  his
office conferred  a kind  of legitimacy on  arguments that might other-
wise be easy to dismiss. Nor is it irrelevant that some of Justice Scalia's
law clerks became  academics. In fact, a significant source  of informa-
tional and  reputational  influences  will  come,  directly  and  indirectly,
from  the  selection  of Supreme  Court  clerks,  and  from  the  choice,
among clerks of particular justices, to become law professors. In a pre-
vious  generation,  the  law  clerks  of  Felix  Frankfurter,  greatly  influ-
enced by Frankfurter, became influential academics; the same appears
to be true of Scalia clerks today.
More  generally,  the  1980  election  of President  Reagan  made  it
most  unlikely  that  the  Supreme  Court  would  continue  to  use  the
Equal Protection  and Due Process Clauses  as bases  for announcing a
series of new  rights for  disadvantaged  people.  Sensibly  enough,  aca-
demics interested in social reform showed decreasing interest in elabo-
rating legal  doctrine  for that purpose. Perhaps  the  rise  of interest in
constitutional deliberation  outside of the courtroom had something to
do with  the  Court's  lack  of receptivity  to the  professors'  arguments.
Perhaps  diminished  interest  in judicial  review  had  something  to  do
with  the  changing  composition  of the  Court. 18  Highly  visible  public
events  with  legal dimensions,  such as  the 1998  Clinton  impeachment
and  the 2000  postelection  struggle  between  George  W. Bush  and  Al
Gore,  will  inevitably  affect  people's  choice  of what  to  write  about.
(Perhaps  Bush v.  Gore will inaugurate  a new era of neorealism, ques-
tioning the division between law and politics.) Academics  may or may
not follow the election returns, but in law, the election  returns can set
the academic agenda.
Other  external  shocks  can  come  from  developments  in  adjacent
fields. If, for example, economists  show a great deal of interest in the
idea of spontaneous ordering,  academic lawyers are likely to show an
interest in that topic, too. Part of the reason  is informational:  the  fact
that  a  certain  topic interests  economists  is  likely  to be  important  to
academic lawyers, many of whom care about what economists  think. If
there  is  a  resurgence  of interest in  utilitarianism  within  philosophy,
law professors  are likely  to write about utilitarianism.  The extraordi-
nary interest  in  the work of  John Rawls  confirms  this point.  Critical
theory  provides  another  case  in  point,  with  Jurgen  Habermas  and
Michel Foucault, for example, exerting a significant influence on legal
18.  See MARK TUSHNET,  TAKING THE CONSTITUTION  AWAY FROM THE COURT (1999).
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scholarship  by virtue of their prominence  within closely related fields.
Of course, developments  within  adjacent  fields might well  be  a prod-
uct of the kinds of influences discussed here.
There is a final issue, perhaps in tension with the general argument
offered thus far. It is useful to distinguish between ideas and methods
on which  multiple  people  can  build  for  a  long  time,  and  ideas  and
methods  that do not lead to  much in  the way of further work.19  The
notion that people are rational, self-interested profit maximizers  is fer-
tile,  in  the  sense  that  it  has  applications  to  many  domains  of  law,
helping  to produce predictions that can be tested and used. Though it
is too early  to say,  I believe  that the same is true for  the notion that
people  are boundedly rational,  and also  for the  claim that people  are
not  only  self-interested.2 0  The  idea  that  law  is  pervasively  based  on
male practices and understandings  is also  easily used  as a basis for as-
sessing, or reassessing, many domains of law. But some claims tend to
"burn out," in the sense that once they have been voiced, there is little
that can be done with them, even  if they are true. Perhaps this is the
case for the contention that law is "political,"  an important and illumi-
nating partial truth, but one with which it is not easy, in the aftermath
of legal realism, to do a great deal of illuminating further work.
CONCLUSION:  THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Academics,  like  everyone  else,  are  susceptible  to  informational
and  reputational  influences,  and  cascade  effects  are  as  likely  to  be
found in the  academic domain as elsewhere.  Notwithstanding  the ex-
pertise and  confidence  of many academics,  academic  life  has its own
fads  and fashions,  and  the  factors  discussed here play  a role  in their
development.  I believe  that these factors  have played  a role  in many
trends  in legal theory, including  critical legal studies, economic analy-
sis of law,  feminism, textualism  and  originalism in constitutional  law,
critical  race  theory,  rights-based  accounts  associated  with  Ronald
Dworkin and  others  (many at New York University),  law  and litera-
ture, and (more recently) behavioral  law and economics.
By  way  of conclusion,  it is  worth emphasizing  that  the  basic  ac-
count  contains  both a  prescription  and  a  cautionary  note.  The  pre-
scription is that those who  seek to promote  ideas will  do best  to en-
sure,  above  all,  that  those  ideas  have  an  opportunity  to  develop
through frequent discussions  among like-minded people. Most would-
19.  Cf.  the discussion of progressive and degenerate research  programs in Imre Lakatos,
Falsification  and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,  in CRITICISM  AND THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).
20.  See RICHARD  THALER,  QUASI-RATIONAL  ECONOMICS  (1991); BEHAVIORAL  LAW
AND ECONOMICS  (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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be "schools"  fail, but those that succeed often transform the field;  and
when they do so, group polarization is part of the reason.
The cautionary note is that in law and many other academic fields,
ideas may spread and prosper, not because  they are good, but because
dozens,  hundreds,  or even thousands  of imperfectly  informed people
have  fortified  the  very  signals  by  which  they  have  been  influenced.
Whether bad ideas can prosper for a long time is another matter. Fre-
quently  good  arguments  and  good  evidence  will  puncture  them,  at
least when there is agreement  about the underlying criteria. But if the
account here is correct, longevity, even for bad  ideas, is hardly out of
the question.